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STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly and of the Security Council the progress report of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan, in pursuance of paragraph 4 (a) of General Assembly resolution 48/208 of 21 December 1993, entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan".

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX

Progress report of the special mission to Afghanistan

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The international community has observed the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and its deleterious effects with mounting concern. On 21 December 1993, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/208, entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan". In paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to dispatch to Afghanistan, as soon as possible, a United Nations special mission to canvass a broad spectrum of the leaders of Afghanistan, soliciting their views on how the United Nations can best assist Afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction, and to submit its findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary-General for appropriate action."

2. On 1 January 1994, fighting intensified in Kabul and several other locations in Afghanistan, provoking further concern about the deteriorating situation in the country, especially the significant civilian casualties, the large number of displaced persons and the failure of the Afghan leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. In this connection, the Secretary-General issued two statements, on 4 and 12 January 1994, respectively, calling for, inter alia, an immediate cessation of the hostilities. His second statement supported the early dispatch of the special mission once conditions permitted and was issued in consultation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. On 24 January 1994, the Security Council issued its first presidential statement on Afghanistan (S/PRST/1994/4) since 12 August 1992. The statement, among other things, reiterated the Secretary-General's call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to dispatch the mission as soon as possible.

3. On 14 February 1994, Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri was appointed by the Secretary-General to head the special mission to Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, he came to New York where he met various Afghan government officials, including two Deputy Foreign Ministers as well as the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations. He also met with representatives of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United States, as well as other countries. He travelled to Washington where he met the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia of the United States, as well as other State Department officials dealing with Afghanistan.

4. On 14 March 1994, the Secretary-General made public his intention to dispatch the mission as soon as possible. On 23 March, the Security Council issued a second presidential statement on the situation in Afghanistan (S/PRST/1994/12), which, among other things, expressed its support for the mission and urged all Afghans to assist it in carrying out its mandate and thus

promote the cessation of hostilities, the resumption of humanitarian aid and the restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

5. The wide support for the special mission in the General Assembly, which unanimously adopted resolution 48/208, is an important indication of the international community's desire to begin a more active effort to help end the conflict in Afghanistan. In addition, the special mission was greatly assisted by the statements of the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

6. On 27 March 1994, the special mission, headed by Mr. Mestiri, began its work in Afghanistan. In addition to Mr. Mestiri, the mission included: Mr. Mousouris, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, as Mr. Mestiri's Deputy; Mr. Francis Okelo, Senior Political Affairs Officer (Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan); Mr. Charles Santos, Political Affairs Officer for Afghanistan (Department of Political Affairs); Mr. Juan de Castro, Economic Affairs Officer (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Mr. John Mills, Spokesman; and Colonel Harry Quirke, Military Adviser (Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan). During its visits to regional and other interested countries, as well as its meetings with Afghan personalities in Europe, the Mission's composition varied.

7. The substantive and logistical support provided by the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the assistance by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations specialized agencies in Afghanistan were indispensable. All members of the mission demonstrated a high degree of competence and provided valuable assistance and advice which was greatly appreciated.

8. From 27 March to 29 April 1994, the special mission travelled in Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Shebergan, Herat, Bamyan, Kandahar and Khost, and in Pakistan to Peshawar and Quetta, where it held meetings with a number of Afghan leaders, personalities and groups. During this period, it also met with Pakistani officials. It then travelled to Teheran, Riyadh, Moscow and Ankara to meet with senior governmental officials. It travelled to Jeddah to meet with officials of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (see appendix).

9. The mission canvassed the views of Afghans through meetings with leaders and groups, private meetings, large gatherings, public addresses, as well as through memoranda, peace plans, letters and notes which it received. It met with a wide spectrum of political leaders, which included, inter alia, President Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Governor Haji Qadir and Mr. Abdul Ali Mazari (Hezb-i-Wahdat-e-Afghanistan); General Abdul Rashid Dostum (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan); Governor Ismael Khan (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf (Ittehad-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); former President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Afghanistan National Liberation Front); Maulawi Younis Khalis (Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani (National Islamic Front for Afghanistan); Commander Jalalludin Haqqani;

Mr. Sayed Mansour Naderi, the leader of Ismailis in Afghanistan; Governor Gul Agha of Kandahar; Commander Amir Lalay; and Mullah Naqib.

10. The mission also canvassed the views of independent personalities, commanders, religious and tribal leaders, scholars, various Shura members, women's groups, and professional, business and student organizations. The mission also met a number of Afghans living abroad, including the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah.

II. FINDINGS

11. Every place it visited, the special mission was warmly greeted by common Afghans as well as those in authority. In fact, in some places it was greeted by thousands, even tens of thousands of people. There were also many spontaneous demonstrations of support, which were often attended by hundreds and in some cases thousands of people.

12. Throughout its itinerary, the mission was approached by numerous Afghans who expressed their thoughts, feelings, ideas and views on how the current situation might be resolved. It received written proposals from most of its Afghan interlocutors, who ranged from political leaders to common Afghans. Most Afghans the mission met presented eloquent and passionate views, many making specific and detailed proposals about the present conflict. In total, the mission received more than 300 peace proposals, letters and requests. It was greatly impressed by the practical and realistic nature of the many ideas and peace proposals, but what was most striking was the convergence of views.

13. Travelling throughout Afghanistan, the mission found that although some parts were still at war, most of the country, at least two thirds, was at peace. It was impressive, for instance, to observe that no arms were seen in the streets of Herat. The effect of the war, however, could be felt throughout the country, spreading instability to various regions. The fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of people, especially from Kabul, to leave their homes, killed and wounded thousands more and obstructed United Nations reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. Moreover, the fighting has undermined the very national institutions necessary to bring peace and to rebuild the country.

14. Wherever the mission met the Afghan public, the people called for an end to the fighting, bloodshed and destruction and the restoration of peace. The Afghan people also called for the United Nations to help end the conflict and bring peace to their country. The expressions of gratitude, support and encouragement were very moving as the people put aside the uncertainties of their present situation to hope again for a better life.

15. The fighting in Kabul seemed mostly to be characterized by artillery, rocket and mortar fire and some bombing. This type of warfare, while generally posing little risk to the combatants themselves, has caused enormous casualties among innocent civilians who have borne the brunt of the exchanges of fire. Since the recent round of fighting began, little territory has changed hands in Kabul.

16. The impression one gets is that many of the soldiers fighting for either side are reluctant to risk their lives in this struggle. Most of the combatants appear to be young men and/or adolescents, many of whom may be illiterate. Over and over again, the Mission was told that the majority of those fighting were doing so for the money since this was one of the only ways to earn a living, especially in Kabul. One point that was clearly made by numerous Afghans, including many engaged in the fighting, was that the present conflict was not a jihad, but a struggle for power.

17. In several northern locations, fighting appeared to involve more conventional military tactics, i.e., infantry assaults with the objective of seizing particular positions. But once again, very little has changed. Almost all the Afghans that the mission spoke with said that no military solution was possible. Events of the last two years and in particular of the last six months, have clearly demonstrated the futility of the military option.

18. The conflict has had a significant effect throughout the country, increasing tensions in many areas, which have occasionally erupted in fighting. Nevertheless, most regions have generally avoided being drawn into the present confrontation.

19. The present economic situation of the country is characterized by an economic infrastructure that has been almost completely destroyed. The economy appears to have deteriorated further during the last two years, with real output declining in 1992/93. In Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, as well as other places, whole sections have been destroyed. Heavy and large industries in Kabul and other cities have been looted. Roads, bridges, communications, electricity, water, schools, irrigation systems and power plants are in ruin. The banking system and civil aviation are in collapse. Much destruction occurred during the war against foreign occupation and the Communist regime. Nevertheless, serious damage has also occurred since power was transferred in April 1992.

20. Recent indications are that price increases are accelerating, with the prices of certain food items and fuel having increased 200 to 300 per cent during the last fiscal year. This trend is likely to continue as no steps have been taken to establish fiscal control and monetary restraint. The direct effects of war caused a substantial fall in agricultural production, with the southern and south-eastern regions being most affected. Before the war, irrigated land produced 77 per cent of all wheat and 85 per cent of all food and agricultural crops. An estimated 27 to 36 per cent of all irrigation systems were directly affected by war, which does not take into account the indirect effects of neglect and abandonment.

21. The shortage of energy directly affects the lives of most people living in the urban and semi-urban areas of Afghanistan. The present non-availability of power and fuel hampers practically all essential services of society, such as public administration, health care, irrigation, telecommunications, civil aviation, road transport and industrial production. The entire infrastructure for importation, transportation, distribution and storing of petroleum products no longer exists. Most of the Government tanker fleet has been damaged or seized by military groups, and oil pipelines from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are no longer operational. Petroleum products are now

widely imported in small quantities by individuals and private entrepreneurs. However, this type of operation is affected by the security situation and is currently not sufficiently organized to meet the needs of the country.

22. As a result of the destroyed infrastructure, only a few local economies have been able to function in certain regions, and the re-emergence of a national and interregional economy has been prevented. In addition, because of the present conflict, national economic institutions have not been able to manage the economy successfully.

23. The main points of agreement the special mission found are listed below:

(a) All Afghans that the mission met unanimously expressed a profound yearning for peace, condemned the current fighting and demanded that it end immediately. They said the fighting was causing untold death, destruction, injury, dislocation and human suffering and viewed the termination of hostilities as a necessary step to begin a political process;

(b) Every Afghan expressed great pride in the victory against foreign occupation and the toppling of the Communist regime. They also expressed appreciation for the sacrifices of the Mujahideen; however, they stressed that they were greatly disappointed that some of their leaders were engaged in the fighting;

(c) All Afghans demanded that the Government of Afghanistan represent the will of the Afghan people. They demanded that all segments of Afghan society be allowed to participate in an equitable and inclusive political process. They also expressed scepticism at whether the present political arrangements could achieve this;

(d) All the people the special mission met, including all the political leaders, were emphatic that foreign interference was fuelling and prolonging hostilities in Afghanistan and that this had to end in order for reconciliation to proceed. Many Afghans, including most of the leaders, requested that the United Nations help prevent foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan;

(e) Even though Afghanistan is a diverse society with many ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations, the people widely identify themselves, first and foremost, as Afghans and Muslims. All Afghans wanted to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Afghanistan;

(f) There was wide support for a transitional period during which a broad-based transitional authority would restore order and security, collect weapons and prepare for some type of assembly or election that would fully reflect the will of the Afghan people;

(g) Most Afghans strongly felt that the international community and the United Nations had deserted Afghanistan for the past two years. They often emphasized that this was probably the last chance to bring peace to their country. They expressed appreciation for the present United Nations approach, which they said had the best chance of bringing peace to the country. In their

discussions with the mission, the Afghans often implored the United Nations not to abandon or fail them and to be involved at every stage of the political process. In this connection, many Afghans called upon the United Nations to re-establish and maintain its physical presence throughout the country and in particular in Kabul;

(h) Most Afghans opposed a non-Afghan armed military presence, including United Nations peace-keeping troops. They said that they would not accept any armed foreign presence in their country. Nevertheless, almost all supported some form of United Nations monitoring, which could oversee a cease-fire and the collection of heavy weapons and supervise elections;

(i) Most Afghans called for a collection of arms and the demilitarization of the country, with many saying it should begin in Kabul. Some groups suggested that there might be some programme of repurchasing or compensation in exchange for weapons. Many suggested that the United Nations should assist in monitoring the disarmament process;

(j) There was wide consensus that a major international effort to assist in the reconstruction of the country was absolutely essential, with particular emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the country. Assistance was also required to help to re-establish medical and educational services and rebuild public institutions, as well as to help address the problem of narcotics trafficking. Afghans viewed the lack of economic alternatives as one of the causes of the war. Many were disappointed that the international community had not provided more assistance. All Afghans, including the leaders, were in favour of starting reconstruction efforts as soon as possible. They viewed reconstruction as integral to establishing a sustainable peace process;

(k) There appeared to be a wide consensus that some sort of security force should be established, initially for Kabul, which would become the nucleus of a national army;

(l) Afghans felt that an important objective of the peace process should be the formulation and adoption of a new constitution that would embody the national sentiment and identity;

(m) In addition to the United Nations, many Afghans expressed confidence and support for the Organization of the Islamic Conference playing a role in the peace process, including the type of monitoring described above;

(n) There was widespread agreement that refugees should be repatriated, with the aid of the international community, and that their participation in the peace process should be facilitated even before their return;

(o) There were also calls for a United Nations role in monitoring human rights until security and confidence were established.

24. The many proposals received, including those of the political leaders, often went into great detail on the mechanics of establishing an acceptable political process. It was often in the very complex mechanisms that differences of opinion could be noted. But the special mission found many Afghans to be

flexible about their proposals and willing to entertain modifications or changes in order to make the proposals more acceptable.

25. There were some basic differences which focused on the nature and type of the political process, for example, whether there should be a Shura (a consultative body or council), Loya Jirgha (a traditional grand council or assembly), elections, or some combination thereof. Although almost all Afghans expressed the desire for some form of transitional period in which functional governance would be restored, there was a difference of opinion, especially among the leaders, on the type, number and order of steps necessary to achieve this end. Even though some opposed it, the Loya Jirgha was often mentioned as a forum through which a representative government could be established. Nevertheless, there were differences as to its timing, composition and function, as well as how it would be convened.

26. All the regional and other interested countries that the special mission visited, including Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States, expressed their full support for the United Nations efforts and offered whatever assistance was necessary. Moreover, all countries consulted emphasized that they were interested in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan in which the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty were maintained and where the Afghan people would determine their government, free from outside interference.

27. The special mission held two meetings, at Jeddah and Islamabad respectively, with Ambassador Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference for Afghanistan. The discussions focused on how the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference could cooperate to bring peace to Afghanistan.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

28. The fact that the vast majority of Afghans appear to believe that the present conflict is a struggle for power should be of serious concern. The latest phase of the conflict, which began on 1 January 1994, has ruptured the remaining vestiges of a functioning central administration in Afghanistan, which were put into place by agreements negotiated at Islamabad and Jalalabad.

29. The mission was struck not only by the universal belief among Afghans that significant and systematic foreign involvement was taking place, but also by the depth of resentment towards those perceived to be fuelling the conflict in Afghanistan. Even though all the mission's regional interlocutors expressed their full support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan, such perceptions should be of concern to the international community.

30. Afghanistan is now one of the world's largest producers of opium as well as other narcotic drugs. Little money apparently goes to those who grow the illicit crops. Most of the money seems to be made elsewhere. It is obvious

that the lack of central authority and the instability in the country have contributed to an increase in production and trafficking of illicit drugs.

31. The conflict in Afghanistan also flourishes because of the chaotic economic situation and the lack of viable economic alternatives. Many outside of Afghanistan have argued that it is necessary to have peace first, then reconstruction. But the mission believes that reconstruction assistance should not be seen as separate from but integral to a lasting political solution. Political and economic activity are interrelated and interconnected forces, which must be linked in Afghanistan in ways which encourage peace. It is important to point out that in areas where such forces have been encouraged, one sees the beginnings of sustainable economic activity, responsible political leadership and effective administration.

32. Although it may not be possible to begin reconstruction efforts at the same time a political process is being initiated, it is essential that reconstruction efforts begin soon thereafter. Until the infrastructure of the country is repaired and public health and education are restored, the prerequisites for a stable financial system will not emerge and the Afghan economy will remain in its shattered state.

33. UNDP, with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), has implemented some successful but limited reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, which have focused primarily on reconstruction and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, roads, bridges and housing and the production of seeds for agricultural use. These efforts have often been coupled with de-mining operations and have been successful in encouraging economic activity and normalcy in some areas. In these cases, the restart of economic activity has attracted the return of displaced persons as well as refugees. The reconstruction approach of UNDP, which seeks to cooperate with local Shuras (councils) at the district level, has shown great promise in determining and implementing projects for the revitalization of local communities. A number of other agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), have been implementing a variety of important projects, which, in addition to their humanitarian purpose, are complementary to the efforts for reconstruction.

34. Even though ethnic and tribal tensions exist and have widened over the past two years owing to the current conflict, the widespread notion of Afghanistan as a sovereign and independent State still remains a powerful force. The unity of the Afghan nation, however, is increasingly coming under threat from the present conflict. Not only has it undermined the capacity of the political leaders to provide for the basic needs of the people, but also it has eroded the legitimacy and importance of governmental institutions needed to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the State itself. If nothing is done to stem the violence and begin a political process in which all segments of Afghan society are represented, including all ethnic, tribal and religious groups, disintegration could increasingly become a serious possibility, with grave regional and international implications.

35. It is clear to almost everyone in Afghanistan, even to many of those engaged in the fighting, that no military victory by either side is possible. A continuation of the war serves no purpose, except to prevent the emergence of a truly representative political process and the reconstruction of the country. It seems that the Afghan people are losing or have lost confidence in the ability of many of their leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. They have not yet lost faith in their country.

36. At the national level, what is needed is the establishment of an acceptable transitional authority which could oversee a cease-fire, institute a process of disarmament, provide security throughout the country, especially in Kabul, and prepare for some form of elections in one to two years. Before such an authority can be established, there must be a country-wide cessation of hostilities. Any successful political process must involve all segments and groups of Afghan society. Afghans are looking for peace. Many leaders to whom the mission spoke are ready, with the assistance of the United Nations, to work to establish a peace process.

37. The Afghans were adamant that the United Nations should not leave them, imploring the Organization and the international community not fail them. At present, no regional or other country has the support and respect that the United Nations still commands in Afghanistan. The Afghans have seen how the lack of international attention has, in part, fed instability by creating the impression that the world did not care whether there was peace or war in Afghanistan.

38. Clearly, it is time for the United Nations and the international community to assist the Afghans more actively in bringing peace to their country. The international community and the United Nations must stay engaged for peace. A successful comprehensive effort to encourage peace would have to link international reconstruction assistance to a national political dialogue on acceptable transitional arrangements. Such an effort would also have to pursue concerted and coordinated efforts to encourage regional disengagement.

39. The opportunity exists to alter the present stalemated political and military equation with practical diplomatic approaches - not with large peace-keeping forces or some other expansive international effort - and move Afghanistan away from war and towards peace. In any effort, it is important to rely not only on the desire of all Afghans to end the war, but also on Afghan ingenuity and faith in their nation to move the peace process forward. The Afghans saw the United Nations as the last and only way out. There should be no illusions that this will be an easy task. It will require patience, steadfastness and creative political approaches, but it is possible to create a momentum for peace.

40. The first phase of a re-engaged United Nations effort would incorporate the following:

(a) Given the great demand by all Afghans for the United Nations to be in Afghanistan, the Organization should re-establish its physical political presence at Kabul. If this is not possible, Jalalabad could serve as a provisional location, with the political representative making numerous visits

to Kabul as well as visits to other cities. Other specialized agencies and programmes might also consider moving more fully back into Afghanistan, especially UNDP, in order for the political and reconstruction aspects to be more closely coordinated on the ground in Afghanistan. Governments should also be encouraged to re-establish their presence in Afghanistan;

(b) Given the necessity for greater international action and attention to be focused on the situation in Afghanistan, it is recommended that a working group of countries interested in peace, normalcy and reconstruction in Afghanistan be established which would assist closely United Nations peace efforts and eventually prepare an international conference on Afghanistan;

(c) It is recommended that the United Nations begin serious and in-depth consultations with the various Afghan leaders on the establishment of a viable transitional authority and a complete and total cease-fire;

(d) A country-wide cease-fire and the establishment of a transitional authority are essential if conditions are to be established for free and fair elections. Such elections would be the best way to ensure that all segments of Afghan society participate in determining the future of the country. Furthermore, it may be beneficial to explore the possibility of utilizing indigenous decision-making structures, such as a grand assembly or council, to facilitate the necessary conditions for elections.

APPENDIX

Itinerary of the special mission

1. At Islamabad, the special mission began talks with a view to arranging a cease-fire that would enable it to visit Kabul and meet with representatives of the parties engaged in the hostilities, as well as representatives from other segments of Afghan society. While arrangements for the cease-fire at Kabul were being made, the mission travelled to Jalalabad on 30 March 1994, where it visited and heard the views of the displaced persons who had fled Kabul since the beginning of January. It also met with the Governor of Jalalabad, Haji Qadir, the Shuras of the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar and about 200 tribal leaders and intellectuals.

2. From 2 to 6 April 1994, the mission held meetings at Kabul with His Excellency Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan; His Excellency Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Prime Minister; Mr. Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of Hezb-i-Wahdat; Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf, leader of the Ittehad-i-Islami; Mr. Abdul Karim Khalili, Minister of Finance, along with the Minister of Commerce and Mr. Murtazavi; Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud; and representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council, including Dr. H. Mojaddedi of the Afghan National Liberation Front, General Fauzi of Jumbish-i-Milli, a representative of the Hezb-i-Wahdat and Humayun Jarir of Hezb-i-Islami. In addition, the mission met with Commander Jalalludin Haqqani; Mohammad Ali Jawed, Deputy Leader of the Harakat-i-Islami and Minister of Planning; Dr. Najibullah Lafraie, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Arsalan Rahmany, Deputy Prime Minister, along with the Vice President of Harakat (Mohammadi); and the Governor and a Shura of Logar in Mohammad Agha, where an outdoor meeting was held. It also met with the Council of 14 Provinces, led by General Zaher Azimi (Harakat); the Emam Ghazzali Foundation; the Mayor of Kabul, Mr. Fazl Karim Aimagh; and a gathering of the district representatives at the City Hall. It met with the Coordination Council of the Displaced People, other representatives of displaced people, the Lawyers' Association, the Association of Peace Servants, a group of professors from Kabul University, the Afghan Women's Association and other social organizations. In various parts of the city and its surroundings, the mission met with several organized and spontaneous gatherings of large numbers of people who submitted petitions and notes.

3. On 16 and 17 April, the special mission visited Mazar-i-Sharif, where it was greeted by thousands of people. The mission met with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Chairman of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, and other members of the Movement. It also met with intellectuals, professionals, representatives of a medical doctors' association and women's groups, elders from Mazar-i-Sharif, representatives from the northern provinces and displaced people. It held meetings with a number of political figures, including Mr. Sayed Mansour Naderi, the leader of Ismailis in Afghanistan, and Mr. Tawana Taleghani, and visited the camp of displaced people from Kabul. It then travelled by road to Shibergan, where it attended an outdoor meeting of tens of thousands of people, who enthusiastically voiced their support for the

mission and during which many proposals were submitted. The mission then held private talks with General Dostum.

4. On 18 and 19 April, the mission was in Herat, where it held several meetings with Governor Ismael Khan. It also met with a gathering of governors, commanders and other representatives from 14 Afghan provinces, who presented their peace plan. In addition, the mission met with Dr. Jalil Shams, Deputy Foreign Minister, prominent personalities, women's groups and business leaders. The mission also attended the celebration of the second anniversary parade of the liberation of Herat.

5. On 20 April, the mission arrived in Bamyan, where it was received by a large crowd, and attended a rally where leaders presented their views on the conflict. It also had meetings with the head and members of the Shura of Bamyan, with representatives of displaced families, women's groups and Hazara delegations from Bamyan, Uruzgan and Ghazni. It also met tribal elders, representatives of the Hezb-i-Wahdat and a delegation from the province of Parwan.

6. On 23 April and again on 25 April, the mission held meetings at Quetta with the Afghan Consul, Haji Abdul Khaliq, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Hamed Karzai, and a large group of commanders from Kandahar. It also met with delegations from the provinces of Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar. In addition, it met with tribal chiefs and elders representing the Popalzai, Noorzai, Barekzai, Alekozai, Ishaqzai, Aleezai, Achekzai, Tokhi, and Mohammadzai tribes and with representatives from Arghistan, Marouf and Spin Boldak. In addition, the mission held meetings with religious leaders, some 300 persons from Quetta and the southeastern provinces, two groups of students, women's groups, and intellectuals.

7. On 24 April, the mission travelled to Kandahar, where thousands of people greeted it at the airport and outside the Governor's residence. Along with the Governor of Kandahar Province, Gul Agha, the mission met two important commanders, Amir Lalay and Mullah Naqib, as well as other elders and commanders from Kandahar and neighboring provinces. It was unable to meet with another commander, Mr. Sarkateb Atta Mohammed.

8. The mission held meetings at Peshawar on two occasions, from 9 to 11 April and on 26 April. During its first visit, it met with the former Afghan President, Mr. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front; Mr. Maulawi Younis Khalis, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan; and Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. It also met with Maulawi Tarakheel, Deputy Prime Minister Qutbuddin Hilal, Commander Abdul Haq, Minister of Repatriation Farouq Azam, Dr. Taleb and accompanying representatives of the Hezb-i-Wahdat. It also held meetings with delegations from the provinces of Kunar and Paktia and Shinwari tribal leaders. The mission also met with a group of Afghan organizations, including Afghan Mellat party, the Movement for National Unity, the Afghanistan All Mujahids Great United National Islamic Big Jabhah, the Organization for Peace and Disarmament and the Afghan League of Human Rights. In addition, the mission met with Commander Haqqani's Deputy and representatives of Hezb-i-Wahdat. Meetings were also held with tribal leaders, representatives of Afghan women's

associations, a group of Afghan personalities and the Council for Understanding and National Unity of Afghanistan. On 26 April, it met representatives of the Ahmadzai tribe. Owing to their absence from Peshawar, the mission was not able to meet the leader of the Harakat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami, Mr. Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, and the leader of the Harakat-i-Islami, Mr. Mohammad Asef Mohseni.

9. On 28 April, the special mission travelled to Khost and met there with the Governor and Shura, as well as many other leaders, who explained their views at an outdoor assembly of hundreds of people.

10. While at Islamabad, the mission met with Afghan Ambassador Roshan and Foreign Minister Arsala. It also met with Ambassador Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Representative for Afghanistan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and several ambassadors accredited to Pakistan.

11. At Rome, the Mission met with the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, and at Geneva with several former leaders, including Mr. Samad Hamed, former Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan. At Bonn, the mission met a gathering, chaired by Mr. Mohammad Yussef, former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, and attended by some 40 Afghan personalities and former leaders presently residing in Europe and the United States of America.

12. The special mission also met with representatives of regional and other countries, which have a special interest in the situation in Afghanistan and may be in a position to assist in the peace process. In this connection, it travelled to the capitals of a number of countries, where it held discussions with, among others, Ms. Robin Raphel, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia of the United States, President Farouk Leghari and Foreign Minister Sardar Asef Ali of Pakistan, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saoud al Faysal, Foreign Minister Velayati, Interior Minister Besharati and Deputy Foreign Minister Boroujerdi of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Ivanov, as well as Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and Mr. Ozdem Sanberk, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey.

13. Consultations were also held at Jeddah with the Representative for Afghanistan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Regrettably, the mission was unable to visit Uzbekistan owing to a scheduling problem. It intends to do so and meet with President Karimov in the near future.